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INTRODUCTION
Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), or
brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) involve
real-time direct connections between the
brain and a computer (Kubler, 2009;
Wolpaw and Wolpaw, 2011). Bidirectional
feedback between the user and the system
produces physical changes that can restore
some degree of motor or communicative
control for individuals with lost limbs,
extensive paralysis or who are significantly
neurologically compromised (Hochberg
et al., 2006, 2012). In these respects, a BCI
can enable an individual with severe brain
or bodily injury to regain some degree of
agency. By providing the subject with the
relevant type of feedback, the device may
enable her to translate an intention into
an action despite the inability to perform
voluntary bodily movements. There are
two types of feedback with a BCI. The
first concerns feedback about the out-
come of a self-initiated, BCI-mediated
action, such as moving a computer cursor
or robotic arm. It provides only indirect
feedback about brain activity. The second
type concerns direct feedback about the
level of brain activity itself. The first is
more pertinent to the potential to restore
some behavior control in the sense that
one can perceive the success or failure of
their mental act. Although it is still at an
early stage of development, an EEG- or
fMRI-based BCI might also enable mini-
mally conscious individuals or those with
complete locked-in syndrome to commu-
nicate wishes about medical treatment
when they are unable to do this verbally
or gesturally (Sellers, 2013). These appli-
cations of interface technology raise a
number of ethical issues (McCullagh et al.,
2014), three of which I will discuss in this
article. First, in some cases patients’ and
caregivers’ expectations about recovering
motor function with a BCI might not be
reasonable given the cognitive challenges
in operating the system. This might result
in psychological harm when the subject’s
desires and intentions to produce actions
fail to be realized. Second, the different
types of electrodes used to detect and
respond to motor cortical neural signals
involve different levels of invasiveness and
different benefit-risk ratios that have to be
weighed with a view to the probable suc-
cess or failure of the technique. Third, the
use of a BCI for communication in neuro-
logically compromised patients prompts
the question of whether their responses
would be evidence of the capacity to make
informed decisions about their care.
EXPECTATIONS
The user of a BCI can execute an intention
to perform a motor task through changes
in the system caused by electrodes detect-
ing signals in, for instance, the motor cor-
tex mediating the intention. Success in
operating the system depends on a com-
bination of unconscious operant condi-
tioning of brain responses and conscious
goal-directed expectation of the subject.
These depend in turn on how effective the
practitioner is in training the subject how
to operate the system. As in other cases
of traumatic brain injury, goal-directed
thinking in some patients with tetraple-
gia may be impaired if there is signifi-
cant damage to neural networks in frontal
regions mediating planning and decision-
making. This may also impair the subject’s
capacity to understand the benefits and
risks of the technique and give informed
consent to participate in BCI research
and treatment (Hochberg and Cochrane,
2013).
Ordinarily, motor skills are performed
unconsciously and automatically follow-
ing an initial period of conscious atten-
tion and learning. For those with severe
paralysis, however, sustained attention is
required both while being trained to oper-
ate the interface and effectively operating
it to execute motor tasks. Subjects whose
cognitive capacity for planning has been
impaired by injury to the central nervous
system may have difficulty in translating
their thoughts into actions or fail to do
so. Failure to meet the expectation to pro-
duce certain actionsmay cause distress and
harm in some subjects by defeating their
interest in recovering some, albeit lim-
ited, degree of motor control. Planning is
a critical component in moving a pros-
thetic limb, for example. The subject must
indicate with his brain and mind where
the limb should go before executing the
intention to move it. The cognitive work-
load requires considerable time and effort.
This may cause frustration and anxiety
and increase the probability of failure for
some in trying to achieve their goal. It
can exacerbate the feeling of a loss of
behavior control. To minimize the prob-
ability of harm, investigators and practi-
tioners must educate users on the potential
positive effects and limits of BCIs. They
should also adopt strict selection criteria
and include only those with largely pre-
served cognitive functions who could give
informed consent and would more likely
be trained to successfully operate it. This
may seem unfair to those with impaired
levels of cognition who lack these capac-
ities. Nevertheless, the idea of providing
equal opportunity for all paralyzed indi-
viduals to access to a BCI would have to
be weighed against the potential for emo-
tional harm if a subject cannot meet the
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cognitive demands of operating the sys-
tem and his expectations are not met.
Discriminating on the basis of levels of
cognitive function may be justified on
these grounds.
BENEFITS AND RISKS
BCIs utilize wired or wireless systems to
detect and allow transmission of signals
in the motor cortex into actions. The
significance of these systems for bene-
fit and risk to patients depends not so
much on the type used but their level
of invasiveness. Theoretically, the distinc-
tion between wired and wireless systems is
orthogonal to this level. The non-invasive
type consists of scalp-based electrodes that
are part of the equipment required to
record EEG. Because they do not involve
intracranial surgery and implantation of a
device in the brain, they do not involve
a risk of infection or hemorrhage. At the
same time, though, they may not readily
read signals from themotor cortex because
the cranium can smear them.
In electrocorticography (ECoG), elec-
trodes are implanted epidurally or subdu-
rally (Leuthardt et al., 2004). These can
decode motor cortical signals more readily
than scalp-based electrodes because they
are not susceptible to cranial smearing.
But they entail some risk of infection and
hemorrhage. Like the non-invasive system,
both forms of ECoG BCIs impose con-
straints on the subjects’ freedom from the
wires running from the electrodes to the
machine. Wireless systems consisting of
a microelectrode array implanted in the
motor cortex avoid this problem and are
less burdensome for subjects. Because they
can decode and transmit signals from this
region more directly, implanted arrays are
more likely to facilitate the execution of
the subject’s intentions in actions. Still,
this would depend on the specifics of
the neurological deficit and the patient’s
ability to manipulate the BCI. Moreover,
in addition to the risk of infection and
hemorrhage, microelectrode arrays raise
the issue of biocompatibility between the
implanted objects and surrounding neu-
ral tissue. The electrodes may reorganize
and induce changes in the tissue. These
changes may be salutary, especially if they
promote neuroplasticity and the gener-
ation of new neuronal connections that
could bypass the site of brain or spinal cord
injury causing loss of motor function. But
they could also cause adverse changes in
the surrounding tissue and result in neuro-
logical and psychological sequelae. A safe
and effective array that could function for
many years would be one in which the sur-
rounding neuropil grew into the electrode.
This would be more stable and allow mye-
lated axons to be recorded using implanted
amplifiers (Kennedy et al., 2011). If this
occurs, then invasive systems can be func-
tionally superior to and as safe as non-
invasive systems. The first type can have a
more favorable benefit-risk ratio than the
second.
COMMUNICATING WITH A BCI
EEG- and fMRI-based BCIs might enable
individuals to reliably communicate when
they are unable to communicate behav-
iorally (Birbaumer et al., 2008, 2014).
This involves three distinct patient groups.
Minimally conscious patients have resid-
ual awareness of self and surround-
ings. Locked-in patients are fully aware
despite being almost completely paralyzed.
Some of these patients can communi-
cate through voluntary eyelid movements.
These in turn are distinct from com-
pletely locked-in patients who lack the
capacity for any voluntary bodily move-
ments. Conscious perception and expres-
sion of intentions in locked-in patients
is different from that of minimally con-
scious patients, and this may better facil-
itate communication through a BCI. One
challenge for this intervention would be
that BCIs typically utilize visual feed-
back, and minimally conscious and com-
pletely locked-in subjects have limited or
no capacity to receive feedback from and
respond to a visual stimulus in learning
how to operate the system. Alternatively,
tactile or auditory feedback could be
used to enable communication (Kubler,
2009; Hochberg and Cudkowicz, 2014).
Yet even if this modality could over-
come the limitations associated with a
lack of visual feedback, questions would
remain about the meaning of “communi-
cate.” Specifically, it is not clear whether
the responses of linguistically impaired
minimally conscious or even fully con-
scious locked-in patients would be evi-
dence of the cognitive and emotional
capacity to give informed consent to con-
tinue or discontinue artificial hydration
and nutrition (Brady Wagner, 2003; Jox,
2013).
Some investigators have claimed that
fMRI-guided BCIs could enable minimally
conscious patients with a high level of
cognitive function to make these deci-
sions (Peterson et al., 2013). But emotion-
ally laden decisions about life-sustaining
treatment reflect a person’s values and
attitudes about quality of life. It is ques-
tionable whether these values and atti-
tudes can be expressed by simple “Yes”
or “No” responses to questions (Monti
et al., 2010), and yet they have to be
included in any robust sense of “com-
munication.” This involves more than
being aware, even fully aware. More
sophisticated interface systems enabling
the expression of complex semantic pro-
cessing may or may not confirm that
the patient had the requisite capaci-
ties. Hochberg and Cudkowicz point out
that among completely locked-in patients
there have been “no reports of restor-
ing communication using a neural signal-
based BCI in this most severely affected
population” (Hochberg and Cudkowicz,
2014, p. 1852; Birbaumer et al., 2014).
Moreover, Fernandez-Espejo and Owen
acknowledge that, with current interface
technology, simple affirmative or nega-
tive responses to questions about whether
a minimally conscious patient wanted to
continue living would not be sufficient to
establish that the patient had the “cog-
nitive and emotional capacity to make
such a complex decision” (Fernandez-
Espejo and Owen, 2013, p. 808). But
they also say that “it is only a matter
of time before all of these obstacles are
overcome” (p. 808).
This last pointmay be overly optimistic.
Even advanced BCIs that could detect
neural activity correlating with complex
semantic processing might not be suffi-
cient to show that the subject had the cog-
nitive and emotional capacity to make an
informed and autonomous decision about
life-sustaining treatment. Some form of
behavioral interaction may be necessary to
confirm that the subject had this capacity.
Medical professionals and caregivers must
be cautious not to read toomuch into BCI-
enabled responses and interpret them as
having a meaning they lack.
CONCLUSION
BCIs can benefit individuals by restor-
ing varying degrees of motor control and
possibly the ability to communicate. But
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expectations of some subjects and their
caregivers may exceed what they can rea-
sonably achieve with the technology and
result in psychological harm. Selecting
candidates with higher levels of preserved
cognitive function for BCI research and
treatment and educating them on the
potential benefits and limitations of the
technique is advisable to prevent or at
least minimize harm. The fact that a
particular BCI system is more invasive
than others does not imply that it has
an unacceptable degree of risk and may
instead indicate a more favorable benefit-
risk ratio if it does more to enable the
execution of intentions in actions and pro-
mote neuroplasticity. Perhaps the most
significant application of BCIs would be
in enabling minimally conscious or com-
pletely locked-in patients to communicate.
Yet it is questionable that even the most
sophisticated system alone could demon-
strate that these subjects have the ability
to clearly and meaningfully communicate
their wishes and make informed decisions
about life-sustaining treatment. Decision-
making capacity falls along a continuum
correlating with a continuum of cogni-
tive and emotional capacities, and there is
no algorithm providing a definitive answer
to the question of where the threshold at
which one has a sufficient degree of these
capacities lies. All relevant parties need to
be cautious and not infer that a BCI indi-
cating certain levels of brain activity and
semantic processing in a subject is evi-
dence of an understanding of the ethical
magnitude of life-and-death decisions and
the ability to make them.
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